More on Palestinian Negotiating Maps or Lackthereof
A copy of the best map used by Palestinian negotiators.
Sam, a KF reader, submitted a constructive comment in response to a recent post about the use or unuse of maps by Palestinian negotiators trying to trade “peace for land” with the Israelis (ironically, Palestinians lost both in the end).
KFers wrote that the Palestinian team did not have maps. Sam argues they had them available, based on his research, but whether they used them is another question. He also makes the point that this is indicative of the negotiating team’s failure to tap our national resources, or people power and intellect.
In the spirit of exchange…
Dear KABOBfestI really enjoy the blog but wanted to reach out after reading Mohammad’s
post (”Incompetence in the Face of Oppression“). I also posted this as a comment, so please pass this information on to QuiQui and the others.From what I can tell, the statement from QuiQui’s professor was based on a comment by Edward Said (likely in Peace and Its Discontents) that Arafat signed Oslo without looking at a map. Excusing Said’s penchant for hyperbole when discussing Arafat post-Oslo, the PLO-and Arafat in particular-not referencing a map is different from the PLO “not having a map.” The Palestinian negotiating team at Madrid (which was of course sidelined and undermined by the signing of Oslo) had maps that they referred to including those of settlement growth since 1967 and other demographic information. One of the cartographers for this effort was Khalil Tufakji who worked for Feisal Husseini in the Orient House in Jerusalem. He is well quoted in the main stream Western and Middle East press and has published articles in numerous places.
After Oslo was signed, the PA/PLO team used some of these maps and other supporting information from the Madrid group in the follow-up negotiations to implement Oslo and then Oslo II (the West Bank “withdrawal”) again from Tufakji and the Orient House. Whether Arafat and the others chose to use the maps or not is a different story.
My understanding is that in the lead up to Oslo II the final sticking points of the negotiations were inevitably resolved by Arafat and Peres (after Rabin was assassinated) in one-on-one negotiations. So it is not correct to say they didn’t have maps, they absolutely did – but again choosing to use the maps and how they
are used is a different matter.Moreover, in reference to Diana’s point, if the only maps that were used during the initial negotiations were Israeli maps that the Palestinian team got only a glancing look at and were written in Hebrew, the issue is not the “illegality” of the Palestinian team being in possession of maps of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem but the wisdom of the Palestinian leadership to engage in such a process.
Moreover, considering the number of Palestinians who speak and read Hebrew fluently, why one would not be part of the negotiating team again reveals that this is not
an issue of lack of competent resources, but the incompetent application of available resources to what is arguably the single most important series of negotiations for the Palestinian national movement. Sadly, the issue of maps as part of the Oslo negotiations, is but one of many where the Palestinian leadership ignored or neglected the human and material resources that could be leveraged from the broader Palestinian professional and academic community and chose to rely on the instincts of Arafat and his cronies and the good graces of the U.S. and Israeli negotiating teams. The results are self-evident.Keep up the good work, Kabobfest is an enjoyable read.
