Knock Knock– Who’s there? It’s me, Hussein Ibish, please let me in!
The past few months have witnessed what might be described as a bad Knock Knock joke between two schools of thought in the Arab American community. On the one hand, there are the pro-establishment organizations like the American Task Force on Palestine, which realistically has only one outspoken proponent, Hussein Ibish. On the other hand, there are the anti-establishment folks who rally around Arab-American intellectuals like Joseph Massad, Ali Abunimah, and As`ad AbuKhalil. The discussion has basically consisted of a number of entreaties by Ibish for people to engage his arguments directly and to let him into the mainstream of Arab-American discourse; and on virtually no accounts has anyone actually taken him up on the offer.
We aren’t either — we’re simply reporting.
Ibish, who KABOBFest once parodied as the self-proclaimed President of the Palestinians for reaching a mock(able) peace agreement with Israel, has had few good things to say about the generally respected latter personalities. In fact, he has gone out of his way to posture himself as the moderate and trustworthy Arab American while battering with innuendo those other, vastly more popular figures he calls “crackpot” extremists or Islamist sympathizers.
One aspect of this debate has been what I’ll politely call a “disagreement” about the virtues of one-state or two-state advocacy in Palestine. Ibish/ATFP recently self-published a PDF file that he believes debunks arguments made in favor of the one-state solution, and just about died of frustration when nobody he was trying to provoke really cared enough to respond. In a blog post he had no shame publishing with the Israel Policy Forum, which is “committed to a strong and enduring U.S.-Israel relationship and to advancing the shared interests of the United States and the State of Israel,” Ibish almost concedes his own irrelevance as far as the Palestine solidarity movement is concerned, explaining that folks in the establishment and on the Hill should learn what grassroots activists are thinking because their ideas must be refuted, especially–get this–”at a time when ending the occupation and establishing a Palestinian state has become not only a US foreign policy goal, but a national security priority.” From this we can discern two things: grassroots activists pose a threat to the State Department’s enduring efforts to liberate Palestine and Ibish’s PDF file can help contain them; and Ibish apparently takes as his audience not those same activists but the people on the other side of the power equation, those trying to discredit the critics. Really.
I have no reason to be ashamed for not wasting my time reading the PDF file, but it might be worthwhile to link to Helena Cobban’s response, where she dubs Ibish’s organization the (Very) American Task Force on Palestine for its near identical stances as the State Department. Or Adam Horowitz reaction to the PDF file: “I was a bit bored myself.” Or, what is probably the most thought-provoking response to this kind of discourse that discards the one-state advocates as unrealistic or impractical, Abunimah’s words:
Isn’t it ironic that the most enthusiastic boosters of the ugly collaboration between the Israeli occupation army and US-trained PA militias to suppress resistance to the occupation, simultaneously insist that it is implausible for Palestinians and Israelis to build a joint society under conditions of equality? Apparently Palestinians and Israelis can collude to maintain oppression and injustice but not to transcend them!
A point has to be made here about the difference between visionaries (Abunimah, grassroots activists) and functionaries (Ibish, ATFP, the Palestinian Authority). In a recent column for Al-Ahram (which in parts suffers from a pretty rough translation and really awkward syntax in English), Azmi Bishara eloquently touches on something akin to this distinction. Bishara writes about those who “think of themselves as an integral part of the international order” who are happy they “are no longer on the outside, like militant revolutionaries.” They have “disdain for what liberation movements generally regard as the heart of their mission” out of a belief that by their membership in the “international order” they will achieve their goals.
If any of this sounds familiar when it comes to people from the ATFP like Ibish, it’s because they are part of the same pro-establishment camp. Only in the former case the “establishment” is the “international order” as dictated by the United States and in the latter camp the “establishment” is the machinery of power in US foreign policy making. The odd thing is that their imagination is so tragically myopic that they regard grassroots activism or mass movement building as ineffectual, hopeless, or delusional, if not also something worth fearing. Ibish asks embarrassingly silly questions like “how will we convince Israel to give up all of its land if we can’t even convince it to end the occupation?” as if it is really the case that activists are trying to “convince Israel” of anything, and as if it is the case that the ATFP or the PA have “convinced” the United States of anything positive for the Palestinian people.
Ibish/ATFP will scuttle around Washington to “convince” (pander to?) leaders urging them to be a little nicer, but their thoroughly disempowering strategy is all but rejected by Palestine solidarity activists in the United States. Member organizations of one prominent coalition voted overwhelmingly last month to adopt a cultural and academic boycott of Israel as part of its campaign, a position in diametrical opposition to the kind of “convincing” (pandering?) Ibish & Co would rather engage in. It is unclear how the strategy of “convincing” (pandering?) ever strengthens your negotiating position, unless by “your position” you mean the trappings of your position rather than collective gains.
If Ibish’s PDF has fallen on deaf ears, it is for precisely the reason that he does not work with the same logic grassroots activists adopt when it comes to challenging power. How Ibish and other establishment figures reduce political movements to the mere task of “convincing” (pandering!) is beyond me, but it might be related to their failure to understand that the object of their critique, grassroots activists, rarely make pretenses about “convincing” leaders to act differently. One wonders what kind of uncreative and controlled mind you must have to be eternally fixated on such a managerial question. Popular organizing is about forcing the leader’s hand and transforming the “order,” not politely currying favor in the hope that the leader might change his/her mind. Ibish and ATFP are functionaries precisely because their style of work (pandering) has no transformative power.
When the pro-establishment approach reaches a point where the (expired) President of the Palestinian Authority abandons the most powerful international and institutional indictment of Israeli war crimes in history for the sake of private business interests, and where the much hyped ATFP-sponsored settlement freeze of the past several months ends up being a huge charade, you cannot blame people for wanting to take matters into their own hands. But you can blame the establishment and its allies for wanting to take it out of theirs. There are policy makers (functionaries, Ibish) and then there are political strugglers (visionaries, Bishara, Abunimah).
Too funny–or too bad–that the the functionaries, as much as they proclaim themselves to be troubled by the status quo, are so fixated on undermining the visionaries that they end up walking right back into the status quo, cheerleading other functionaries like Salam Fayyad and Mahmoud Abbas, instead of building new loci of power that challenge the old system and are more accountable to the people.
Why are the “crackpot” extremists or Islamist sympathizers more popular?
There is no possible "one-state" solution so we can dismiss as retarded anyone who advocates that.
Concerning "collaberation" or working with Israel: Israel and the Palestinians are the two parties in this conflict, there will be no solution without "collaberating" – that's the part that makes no sense, some people want to reject anyone who works with Israel, and yet that is what must be done.
Defying and rejecting the big players like Israel and the U.S. State Dept seems to be the order of the day for some, but what is that ever going to accomplish? How is opposing the world going to produce and progress?
In Abunimah’s words: "…simultaneously insist that it is implausible for Palestinians and Israelis to build a joint society under conditions of equality?" Isn't that exactly what people do when they reject anyone who "collaberates" with Israel?
In Azmi Bishara's words: They have “disdain for what liberation movements generally regard as the heart of their mission” [such as Hamas plainly stated goal of destroying Israel?] out of a belief that by their membership in the “international order” they will achieve their goals.
They won't destroy Israel by being part of the international community, but they will achieve more progress and success than their counterparts in the fantasy/visionary movement.
Destroying Israel or forcing it to absorb the Palestinian population into one state is delusional!
collaboration
Yaman you clearly reject negotiation or diplomacy in favor of more radical methods. I submit to you that this is a mistaken idea.
Engaging in violence against Israel is what has dis-empowered the Palestinians the most – they have lost every war, every fight, have been reduced to suicidal methods that in the long run have just made everything worse for them. Fighting Israel is not winnable – it's just a glaringly obvious reality.
It is clear that this strategy has weakened the negotiating position immensely.
The Boycott movement should be applauded as a more intelligent way of doing things.
the most powerful international and institutional indictment of Israeli war crimes in history
The Goldstone report… it is the closest thing Hamas has had to success, so to have it yanked away as the report becomes known as very biased is a crushing blow to them, after years of sacrificing civilians and perpetraiting crimes to achieve a sort of "win" like this.
I submit to you that obstinance, hatred, stubbornness, and ignorance will cause the situation to remain in the status quo more than anything else. How has the status quo changed since Hamas took power (other than getting worse)? Hamas are a failure! They embrace a sort of obtuse strategy that produces nothing.
//Defying and rejecting the big players like Israel and the U.S. State Dept seems to be the order of the day for some, but what is that ever going to accomplish? How is opposing the world going to produce and progress?//
Well! collaborating with U.S.Israel has produced very little results. Oslo accord was supposed to give birth to a Palestine state, like how many years ago? And how many promises of a Palestinian state did Bush give during his 8 years in office, and every-time the Arabs were suckered into believing him selling their conscience in the process, while Bush invaded Afghanistan and Iraq. As if not enough Arab lands were occupied in the first place. There can be no peace as U.S.Israel has proved time and time again to be a dishonest partner for peace.
//The Boycott movement should be applauded as a more intelligent way of doing things. //
Haha. Keep dreaming. There are people who will fight to get their rights.
//How has the status quo changed since Hamas took power (other than getting worse)? Hamas are a failure! They embrace a sort of obtuse strategy that produces nothing.//
Fatah/PLO is a bigger failure. They have sold their souls to become jail wardens instead of leaders of their nations. Hamas is the only Palestinian organization which can bring peace. Peace with dignity. Fatah is dead.
Hamas has done such a good job bringing peace with their rockets.
//Engaging in violence against Israel is what has dis-empowered the Palestinians the most – they have lost every war, every fight, have been reduced to suicidal methods that in the long run have just made everything worse for them. Fighting Israel is not winnable – it's just a glaringly obvious reality.
It is clear that this strategy has weakened the negotiating position immensely. //
The only reason that Arafat or Abbas got to become jail wardens was because they fought for it. Otherwise they would just be any other Arab slave to the Zionuts's whims.
Destroying Israel or forcing it to absorb the Palestinian population into one state is delusional!
Hezbollah showed fascist methods both in its kidnapping of Israeli soldiers and in initiating that action without any consideration for the Lebanese government of which it was a member. Indeed, Lebanese democracy is a greater enemy of Hezbollah than Israel.
So you support democracy in Lebanon, but not in Palestine?
Elections have been called for in Palestine, haven't you heard?
I was referring to the democratic elections in Palestine where Hamas won. But I guess those don't count since your guys didn't win.
Hamas won, and it counted. And they got all the benefits and consequences that came along with Hamas.
Things would've gone much better for everyone if Hamas had recognized Israel as a nation and renounced violence. But they didn't. So the Palestinians enjoyed the benefits of that too.
Well Hamas won some elections, but then they took over all of Gaza by force…
Gaza: Armed Palestinian Groups Commit Grave Crimes | Human Rights
in the Gaza Strip, armed Palestinian groups have committed serious violations of international humanitarian law, in some cases amounting to war crimes, Human Rights Watch said
nobody voted for that!
How is kidnapping soldiers fascist?
"A form of political behavior marked by obsessive preoccupation with community decline, humiliation or victimhood and by compensatory cults of unity, energy and purity, in which a mass-based party of committed nationalist militants, working in uneasy but effective collaboration with traditional elites, abandons democratic liberties and pursues with redemptive violence and without ethical or legal restraints goals of internal cleansing and external expansion." [Robert O. Paxton, "The Anatomy of Fascism," 2004]
Hezbollah behaved like an autocracy – there was no consideration for the Lebanese government of which it was a member.
They seek suppression of the opposition through terror , and a policy of belligerent nationalism and racism (and Islamism). They used Lebanon for for their own interest as they defined it. They initiated a war that Lebanon didn't want.
Nothing wrong in capturing an IDF terrorist. You should be grateful that he's not being tried in a court of law for war crimes.
What is wrong is the kidnapping of 11000 Palestinians by IDF terrorists, and who are still languishing in Israeli gulags.
Capturing soldiers is an act of war. Nothing wrong with it? But wasn't your kind who complained so heavily about the ensuing war, caused by Hezbollah's action? And wasn't it your types who couldn't understand why Lebanon's legitimate military did not enter the war against Israel? The principal parties were Hezbollah paramilitary forces and the Israeli military.
The conflict began when Hezbollah militants fired rockets at Israeli border towns as a diversion for an anti-tank missile attack on two armored Humvees patrolling the Israeli side of the border fence. Clashes spread to Lebanon as Hezbollah raids Israel – Africa & Middle East – International Herald Tribune
Of the seven Israeli soldiers in the two jeeps, two were wounded, five were killed, and the bodies of two of the dead were taken to Lebanon.
On 11 August 2006, the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved UN Resolution 1701 in an effort to end the hostilities. The resolution, which was approved by both Lebanese and Israeli governments the following days, called for disarmament of Hezbollah, for withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon, and for the deployment of Lebanese soldiers and an enlarged United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) force in southern Lebanon.
The UN Mideast Ceasefire Resolution Paragraph-by-Paragraph
In the time since the enactment of UNSCR 1701 both the Lebanese government and UNIFIL have stated that they will not disarm Hezbollah.
Who Will Disarm Hezbollah?
read and learn, my ignorant little friend
no one seems eager to disarm Hezbollah
Capturing soldiers is an act of war. Nothing wrong with it? But wasn't your kind who complained so heavily about the ensuing war, caused by Hezbollah's action? And wasn't it your types who couldn't understand why Lebanon's legitimate military did not enter the war against Israel? The principal parties were Hezbollah paramilitary forces and the Israeli military.
The conflict began when Hezbollah militants fired rockets at Israeli border towns as a diversion for an anti-tank missile attack on two armored Humvees patrolling the Israeli side of the border fence. Clashes spread to Lebanon as Hezbollah raids Israel – Africa & Middle East – International Herald Tribune
Of the seven Israeli soldiers in the two jeeps, two were wounded, five were killed, and the bodies of two of the dead were taken to Lebanon.
On 11 August 2006, the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved UN Resolution 1701 in an effort to end the hostilities. The resolution, which was approved by both Lebanese and Israeli governments the following days, called for disarmament of Hezbollah, for withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon, and for the deployment of Lebanese soldiers and an enlarged United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) force in southern Lebanon.
The UN Mideast Ceasefire Resolution Paragraph-by-Paragraph
In the time since the enactment of UNSCR 1701 both the Lebanese government and UNIFIL have stated that they will not disarm Hezbollah.
Who Will Disarm Hezbollah?
read and learn, my ignorant little friend
no one seems eager to disarm Hezbollah
What’s wrong with Hussien Ibish’s Argument.
In his new book “Whats Wrong with The One-State Agenda?” Hussien Ibish responds to a growing literature that has revived an old idea for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I have just finished reading the entire manuscript (including the typo on page 100) and below are my immediate reactions:
An Argument Founded on a Skewed Concept
The book begins with a preface by Dr. Ziad Asali of the American Task Force for Palestine who states “Dr. Ibish has made a definitive case from the perspective of the Palestinian national interest for reaffirming the commitment to seeking a negotiated agreement with Israel…based on two states..” To say the least, this is far from the truth. However, it proves an important starting point for diagnosing this argument as well.
The idea of the “Palestinian National Interest” runs rampant through Ibish’s book and one would think that it should in any book on a Palestinian national political agenda. The problem is, Ibish never defines what this “Palestinian National Interest” is or how he arrived at concluding what it is. The closest Ibish comes to a definitions is on page 12 where he states “the Palestinian national goal is still ending the occupation and securing an end-of-conflict agreement with Israel”. Throughout his book however, he uses the “Palestinian National Interest” as the backbone of an argument that dismisses the one-state agenda and many of its arguments including the need for the right of return and democracy and equal rights.
So this begs the questions, what could possibly lead Ibish to deduce that the Palestinian National Interest is what he claims it is. He almost interchangeably uses Palestinian National interests, aims and goals throughout the text. It is important to note that because this idea is defined so loosely in the book, yet used so often, that one has to read the entirety of the book to understand the general concept in the context of Ibish argument.
Let us take a moment to think about national interest as a general concept. Most often, this is a concept used to understand state behavior. One might understand the Chinese government’s claim that it is in direct contradiction to their national interest to permit autonomy for greater Tibet (which constitutes 25% of Chinese territory) or the Russian government’s position on Chechnya (a tiny fraction of Russian land) Therefore, it should raise serious questions, to say the least, when Ibish claims that it is in the Palestinian National Interests to abandon claims to 78%- 85% of its territory.
Still, it is perhaps unreasonable to define “National Interest” of Palestinians who do not have a state, in the same way we would define it for long standing nation-states in the international system. In this rare case, we are not trying to define the interest of a clearly defined geopolitical entity but rather, the interests of a people.
If we are to accept that the “Palestinian National Interest” should be defined by the aspirations of the Palestinian people (and I believe it should) then we must ask who are the Palestinian people and what do they want. This is what Ibish attempts to do in building his concept of Palestinian aspirations but fails rather obviously and dramatically in doing so. He argues that “polling data” which he conveniently neglects to cite “consistently and clearly shows a marked preference for two states on the part of both Palestinian and Israeli majorities” (pg. 84). Elsewhere he claims the idea is supported by a “huge majority of Palestinians” (pg. 95)
But who are these Palestinians that Ibish speaks of? Though no actual polling data was cited in a study which relied directly upon them for this point, it is likely that the data mentioned by Ibish comes from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR). The PCPSR, while not the only Palestinian research center to do polling, is widely considered the best in regard to academic and scientific rigor. Other polling centers, which do not have this credibility, are rarely cited in any serious work. The PCPSR has a long track record of polling which is also attractive to many researchers because this depth allows for the analysis of trends in public attitudes over time.
The problem with this data, however, is that the samples of the Palestinian population survey are limited to the occupied territories. While this survey is scientifically representative of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza it cannot be considered representative of the Palestinian’s as a people, particularly in regard to questions of one-state or two, the right of return, recognition etc.
With just under 4 million Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories, just over a million living in Israel, and many millions more living in the Diaspora, it is only natural to expect that polling done of the selection of Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories would yield different results that a selection representative of the whole. Ibish claims that a huge majority of Palestinians favor the idea of a two-state solution, which in his view requires near absolute compromise on the right of return, based on a population where less than half have lived the refugee experience.
Ibish also suggests that another measure of Palestinian attitudes toward the one-state vs. two-state debate is the degree to which Palestinian political parties adopt one of the agendas. ”until a major national Palestinian political party or mass movement dedicates itself to the advancement and realization of this agenda and begins to explicate its aims with specific political proposals, it will remain an abstraction fit for academic musings and vague polling questions, but not a really existing political program”. (pg. 84) Obviously, this presupposes that Palestinian political parties are to some extent representative of the entire Palestinian people, which is a hard case to argue systematically. Second, it is unreasonable to expect any “major national Palestinian political party” to adopt a one-state agenda when these parties operate within a post-Oslo political structure, based on a two-state outcome, which would prevent them from doing so.
So it remains to be seen exactly how Ibish arrives at this concept of national interest. While grandiose territorial claims may not factor into the interests of a stateless people, their aspirations should. Mr. Ibish concedes as much when he bases his argument on public opinion surveys. Unfortunately, the surveys are not representative of the people as a whole. Now, should Mr. Ibish claim that a two-state solution, which requires abandoning the right of return, be is desired by of those living under occupation in the WB and Gaza and consequently the political powers which operate within those territories then the argument makes sense, but that is not the case.
It is, of course, unattractive for proponents of a two-state solution to acknowledge that the outcome inherently relies on fulfilling what seem to be the aspirations of a minority of Palestinians. Perhaps this is why, in the context of a growing and popular literature on the one state outcome, Mr. Ibish refuses to acknowledge that which is easily inferred from his argument. Finally, not only does Ibish fail to support the assertion that Palestinian goals are based in Palestinian aspirations, he suggests instead, that the Palestinian goal should be what Israel is willing to permit. Israel “will not in the foreseeable future plausibly agree to such an arrangement, it cannot in practice be realized and insisting on it means preferring continued conflict to peace” (pg. 54)
Other Problems
While the argument relies on a definition of the “Palestinian National Interest” which is inherently flawed, other problems persist in Ibish’s book as well.
For example, take the claim he makes against proponents of a One-State agenda, that their categorical denial of the viability of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza is unfounded. (pg. 39) He states that “few, if any of these commentators, identify exactly when the possibility of a Palestinian state was finally and irrevocably foreclosed” (pg. 40) It seems reasonable for demand Ibish to demand from One- State advocates that if we have crossed a threshold, they should be able to point to one. However, Ibish too fails to say what the last straw would be in regard to the Israeli colonization of the West Bank. While he suggests that East Jerusalem is a necessary and inalienable component of a future Palestinian state, he then goes on to claim that a peace agreement failing is not a “function of the critical mass of administrative, topographical, and infrastructural changes constructed by Israel in the Occupied Territories. Rather, it is that moment when a critical mass of Israelis and Palestinians conclude that such a peace agreement is no longer feasible of desirable.” (pg. 137) Following this logic, and standards required in Ibish’s book, if sufficient polling of the residents of Abu Dis accepted a Palestinian State on Abu Dis alone, then a peace agreement is still possible. We just would need to redefine who is a of “Palestinian” again to suit the argument.
He also argues that One-State advocates have failed to describe how and why the state of Israel would be willing to give up its sovereignty over all of the land and dissolve itself when it has thus far be unwilling to compromise on 22% of the land. This too seems like a reasonable request from Ibish. The problem, however, is that this presupposes that we currently have a two-state problem for which we need a two-state solution. In fact, we have a One-State problem for which Ibish is hoping a Two-State solution would suffice. A One-State outcome would not require Palestinians to increase capabilities (political, military, or economic) and do more to persuade Israel to submit, rather it would simply require Palestinians to do less of what they are doing now; cooperating with a seemingly failed two-state framework.
If Palestinians in the Occupied Territories today were to abandon the Oslo framework, the Palestinian Legislative Council and the Palestinian Authority, which requires nothing more than simply dissolving these entities, the Palestinians would expose the conflict for what it is. This is not, as Ibish describes, a battle between two dueling ethno-centric narratives, but rather one geopolitical entity with significant and structured political repression along ethnic lines. This in turn would require a modern era civil rights movements resulting in ethnic power sharing.
Another claim Ibish makes is that the One-State agenda should be abandoned in favor of the Two-State agenda because the Two-State agenda has a strong foundation in international law. But again, is international law, particularly the body to which Ibish points, a fair arbiter between the two agendas? International Law, especially laws relating to the control of territory, was written by and for nation-states. It is unreasonable to expect laws created by states, and enshrined in the Westphalian principle of sovereignty, to support any solution which challenges the sovereignty of any state in the international system. (In this case Israel)
Conveniently for his argument, Ibish ignores another component of international law, international human rights law, which supports the right to return. Of course, legal support for the right to return would complicate the two-state agenda and for this reason Ibish omits it. It is, at this point, relevant to discuss the UN Declaration of Human Rights Article 13 which states:
1.Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.
2.Everyone has the right to leave any country, including their own, and to return to their country.
It is important to note the distinction in the use of wording in the first and second clause of the Article. In the second clause, the right of return to one’s “country” is explicit. The word “state” is not used here specifically because state presence over countries can change during wartime when refugees are most often created. This was understood by the writers of this document and therefore the return of refugees into a “Palestinian State” but not their country would not constitute the legal realization of this fundamental human right.
Further, Ibish also pits efforts to end the occupation against the one-state agenda yet he offers little proof for this diametric opposition and toward the end of his manuscript even allows for the possibility of a two-state solution leading to a one-state “distant eventuality”.
My comments and criticism of Ibish’s work were much longer than what I took the time to type up. In sum, I see the work as flawed from the outset as it is based on a concept of Palestinian National interest which was not defined and is obviously problematic given the aforementioned issues. This is not to say that I disagree with every point Ibish makes in the book. I think one of the most valuable points made in this book, which I share, is that the literature on the One-State solution needs to focus more on what the outcome would offer Jewish Israelis and how the outcome could possibly come about. This would give the One-State argument more political traction in the mainstream. However, just because this is not a significant part of the One-State literature does not mean that the solution offers nothing to Jewish Israelis or is impossible to implement.
Overall, while Ibish’s book is a contribution to the debate between the two agendas, it is hardly a significant one. Most of what Ibish argues are problems with the One-State solution, which makes up the bulk of his book in rather redundant fashion, were already evident to One-State advocates. He also did not respond to criticism of the Two-State solution by one-state advocates but rather deflected them or simply downplayed their significance. The right of return, the dominant theme in the Palestinian struggle, received attention in an insignificant part of the manuscript. At one point he claims that “serious observers” have realized that the right of return and East Jerusalem are “compromises the two parties can usefully exchange in crafting a painful but acceptable and necessary agreement”. Any survivor of Dier Yassin’s massacre, or any Palestinian for that matter, would tell you that accepting only East Jerusalem is already a compromise.
The complicated issue of Palestinians living inside of Israel and the demographic reality they constitute was barely even mentioned. Ibish accuses One-State advocates of diverting focus from the occupation to other issues such as the right of return and Palestinians in Israel but simply commits the inverse in his book.
Regardless to the final configuration of borders or the number of states created; there can be no lasting settlement which does not appeal simultaneously to the Palestinian sense of justice and the Israeli sense of security. I believe this can be done in either One-State or Two-State solutions if properly arranged and negotiated.
One thing however which is non-negotiable is the fact that Palestinian national goals should be determined by Palestinians and not by what outsiders, including the State of Israel are willing to permit Palestinians to achieve. The Palestinians who determine national goals regarding a settlement with Israel should be all Palestinians who are stakeholders in the outcome. This includes all whose lives have been irreparably affected by the depopulation of Palestine from 1947-1949 and those living under occupation today.
This is not to say, as some may argue, that those who are not Palestinians should be part of the discussion. Anyone, with an informed perspective, should be able to contribute to the discussion. I would not want anyone telling me that I should not speak about Lebanon or Egypt or some other country simply because I am not from there. This should go without saying.
At the same time, I would say that anyone who neglects the points of view of a majority of Palestinians in their deduction of Palestinian national interests is either uninformed or intentionally misleading.
Improving the Palestinians' human rights situation as well as overall standard of living should be put above getting revenge against Israel.
Hopefully the Amnesty International report on the water can bring attention to the water situation and get momentum going for improvement, mainly to the Palestinians' own water infrastructure which needs development – especially in Gaza where the water system and the sewage system are in critical shape.
It's strange how people reject the leaders who stand the most chance of getting things done in favor of those who want to lauch rockets and see the situation deteriorate further.
First of all, the water issue has been known for years. Multiple agencies of Palestinian civil society have reported on Israeli theft of water resources before. Outcome? More settlements, more water theft.
Why do you imagine that Abbas and Fayyad are most likely to get things done? Or, to be more precise, isn't it important to say exactly which things those might be?
That's the funny thing isn't it? Those who keep yelling that they're the only ones who can get things done, by being 'pragmatic' with Israel, are the ones on who's watch the settlements, land and water theft increases.
They think we don't notice because while resources are stolen in the West Bank, Gaza is under siege. The siege of Gaza is very convenient for their deception.
It happened while the Fedayeen and Hamas watched to.
A lot of people don't want to live under dictatorial rule. Democracy is a good thing. There are a lot of people that weren't huge fans of Hamas, but still voted for them as an alternative to an increasingly corrupt Fatah. It's odd to me that people don't think Palestinian voters matter. I think that you can support a better standard of living for Palestinians, while supporting democracy at the same time; that would seem like the logical way forward to me.
I basically agree with Yaman's assessment of the ridiculous Ibish, whose efforts on behalf of collaborators are legendary. But I disagree with the conclusion that he is best left ignored, as finer minds than his-Abunimah, et al-have done.
I don't fear that responding to his arguments in some way awards them an unearned prestige. On the contrary, showing them to be empty is a service to those whose understanding of the issue may be less sophisticated than that of many here. While I applaud Yaman and Dameer for their efforts to debunk Ibish, I think what's needed is a fuller dissection of his argument.
To be clear while I don't particularly care enough to engage his arguments I do not think others who are more qualified should necessarily do the same. It's worthwhile pointing out the flaws in his thinking (as Dameer does above) but it is also important to consider other contextual factors like those I mentioned above and that others have brought up. An argument should be judged on its merits but the argumentative context is also an argument worth considering or responding to.
"the argumentative context is also an argument worth considering"
huh?
Additionally Ibish's plea for Arab-Americans to expand their discourse and engage in debate is extraordinarily disingenuous. First, there is no evidence that people have not responded to those arguments in the present or in the past. Maybe he has not been invited to a dinner party or organizational meeting in a while to see what kinds of discussions are taking place. Second, his own written record, especially vis-a-vis the people named above, tend to show that he is more interested in engaging in the worst kind of ad hominem, and in trashing the personality and reputation of people who threaten his ego, than in engaging them and their arguments seriously. To the extent that there are people who ignore him or no longer take him seriously, it is because of these venomous attacks he makes on people, not because they do not like what he is saying (but most also do not like what he is saying).
I don't think anyone takes Ibish seriously. I agree with the post that Ibish was infuriated that no one responded to his silliness (i.e. his pdf). The sad reality is that Ibish is guilty of what he constantly attacks other people of doing: he goes on ad hominem rampages with very little substance backing up his "ideas." It's very telling that he is working with Israel Policy Forum and various pro-Israel nut jobs to gain legitimacy in Washington. If he wants to promote an anti-democratic and anti-Palestinian agenda, that's his choice, but he shouldn't be so befuddled when no one takes him seriously. Now Ibish may think all those that don't think like him are naive, which is more than his right, but it doesn't take away from the fact that within Palestinian circles (not just the grassroots) he has no legitimacy whatsoever. And given his new friends, it doesn't seem being a chump for anti-Palestinian and virulently pro-Israel forces bother him too much.
Is it weird to anyone else that Ibish sends out memos to his friends begging them to respond to blog posts and articles that criticize him? The guy couldn't even get his book published and had to make it available as a free pdf (and from what I hear, he can't give away hard copies of his book fast enough to random people he meets). And no one reads his blog either (yet he brags about the traffic—but if you check out the Alexa rating, it's clear no one does). Maybe they'll asked him on to Colbert Report again, so he can completely choke and make a fool himself for a second time. Or maybe ATFP will hire more people to slap together short pdf papers that lack citations. The sad reality is this: Ibish has absolutely no purpose in life.
I think Ibish, advertently and/or inadvertently, has made clear the need to begin delineating in which ways
Israelis will benefit from a unified homeland, rather than a fragmented two-state aolution. John Kutab has already very artfully beun this process via his article, "Steps to create an Israel-Palestine", in the December 20, 2009 Angeles Times. I intend to expand on what he has started, and perhaps we can start a bandwagon that will also describe benefits for Palestinians and other local folks,the region, and the world at large.