Contributed by Mehrunisa Qayyum

“Syria is not Libya,” emphasized Ambassador Peter Wittig, as he responded to questions comparing global reactions to intervention in Libya, but not Syria.

“Syria is not Libya,” echoed Edward Luck, US Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect at the United Nations Brookings Institute, as well as other strategy consultants.

Image from the Huffington Post

As Saudi Arabia withdraws its ambassador from Damascus and the US (deleted  has moved to) shut down its embassy, human rights activists, both in Syria, and among the Diaspora, remain puzzled by the Libyan case of the “Right to Protect”, or R2P.  R2P, ultimately, led to imposing a “no-fly zone” in Libya as stipulated in UN Res 1973.   R2P operates as the “Catch-22” for human rights activists who have noted that over 5,000 Syrians have been killed while thousands remain in political detention.   Since March 15th of 2011, when uprisings first emerged in Dara’a, the UK based human rights group, Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, has noted that Syria shares Libya’s experience in that its “elected” leader continues to concoct conspiracies to justify using its army to shoot at and detain its people.

The criteria for R2P appear nebulous and open to interpretation as well as relies on the actions of civil society.  At the same time, there must be multi-lateral support that is generated from the region.  In Libya’s case, the League of Arab States unanimously agreed to implement a no-fly zone.  Next, comes military action on the ground in Syria, such as the emergence of the Free Syria Army (FSA). R2P often presupposes that outside forces will select and arm the opposition of the regime in order to aid the effort. However, this is a misconception. The US Institute for Peace’s interpretation for applying R2P  does not necessitate arming the opposition. Unfortunately, according to Richard Williamson, a nonresident Fellow at Brookings, aiding defenseless civilians usually means empowering an armed faction that frequently commits human rights abuses themselves.

‘Syria is not Libya’

Syria is not Libya for a variety of reasons.  Firstly, population-wise, Libya has only one-third of Syria’s population and has a more homogenous population than Syria.  Secondly, Iran is not Libya’s ally.  Thirdly, Syria is involved in all other ‘fault lines’ that challenge its neighbors: 1) the Kurdish issue, 2) Lebanon, 3) Iran, and 4) Israel, or the “traditional four pillars of MENA architecture,” as Witting summarily concludes. However, the demographic makeup and political alliances should not obviate the flagrant abuse of human rights violations committed by the Assad regime despite the Arab League’s observer mission and the increased use of targeted economic sanctions.

Well if Syria is not Libya, can it at least learn from its Iraqi neighbor that also underwent a series of authoritarian leaders, followed by economic sanctions. Will the repeat incidence of international condemnation and economic sanctions in Syria benefit from any lessons learned by its neighbor Iraq? I argue that economic sanctions’ revolutionary success depends on civil disobedience. For instance, Egypt’s initial movement began with organized labor strikes and other internal civil society groups who protested Mubarak’s regime. Previously, Tunisia’s peaceful case of resistance provides another example.  When it comes to revolution, change comes from within–before and after the so-called ‘Arab Spring’.

Economic Sanctions: Weapon of Mass Distraction

The R2P debate distracts many from grasping what Syria’s opposition movements and civilians are experiencing on the ground, similar to how the economic sanctions operate as a weapon of mass distraction. Economic sanctions and boycotts by Syrian businessmen assume the role of civil disobedience for a short period of time before family resources become so constrained that black markets emerge or a regime decides to take up arms against its own people.  Prior to the ‘Arab Awakening’, the track record for civil disobedience via boycotts and sanctions have not proven successful as we have seen with Iraq because external sanctions replace the internal frustration with “How do I put food on the table today?”.

Reflecting back before the invasion of Iraq, the economic sanctions were not only effective, but perhaps “too effective” in that Iraq’s economy was isolated from the rest of the world: its primary export, oil, was halted, then controlled by the international community. The dual containment strategy from the eighties morphed into economic containment of Iraq. Yet, there was a human cost to this economic containment. While Iraqi civilians felt the brunt of Saddam’s inhumane treatment of political dissidents and minorities, they also felt the brunt of a decimated economy.

Indeed, the effects of implementing a blockade in trade and investment regarding Iraq, debilitated society in that at least 500,000 Iraqi children died since they had no access to medical services or suffered from malnutrition. I compiled a horrifying list of other statistics, which I will not enumerate here at this time because it deserves a separate book by itself. The Iraqi sanctions regime, ironically, came to an end seven years after the 2003 invasion to remove Saddam Hussein for a variety of reasons that have nothing to do with human rights or the efficacy of economic sanctions.

The R2P debate distracts many from grasping what Syria’s opposition movements and civilians are experiencing on the ground, similar to how the economic sanctions operate as a weapon of mass distraction.

Flash-forward to Syria, where the death toll since the protests began has passed 5,000.

In an act of civil disobedience, Syrian shopkeepers closed theirs stores in Homs, region of Idlib along Turkish border, and parts of the Southern Dara’a province.  A few months earlier, I wrote a piece reviewing the potential for Syrian civil disobedience based on economic factors.  As Wittig noted of the Syrian situation, imposing “sanctions were symbolic.”  Many schools joined the strike by closing in what has been referred to as “Strike for Dignity” and continues even throughout the Arab League observer mission. At the same time, essential goods stores and pharmacies remained open. However, threats of violence to shopkeepers and break-ins by Assad loyalists attempted to interrupt the strike. According to an Al-Arabiya interview, Ali Hassan, spokesman for the Turkish-formed Syrian Revolution Council, an opposition group, said, “..the Hama governor threatened to seal off the stores in the city and forces threatened to set these stores on fire”.

Iraq and Syria differ in some aspects regarding the economic sanctions. Initially, in Iraq’s case, the proponents for implementing sanctions argued that the middle class would respond to the debilitating effects by removing its dictator. The costs of war or military intervention would be avoided. However, the Iraqi sanctions plan backfired regarding the removal of Saddam.  Although the US sanctions operated as an extension of containing Iraq, other US goals for the Middle East & North Africa region’s national security interests fed into the post-9/11 paranoia paradigm. Ultimately, the US conducted a military operation to remove Saddam because the Iraqi opposition had been weakened, either by the sanctions or the decision to migrate, and could not do it for them from within.

In contrast, economic sanctions have galvanized some segments of Syria in that they have expanded their civil disobedience to include the strategy that could not take root in Iraq: a small business protest. Small businessmen shut down stores, but we have not seen major civil disobedience campaigns emerge in Damascus, the largest city and center of Syrian trade.  Although businesses in Damascus and Aleppo continue to operate normally, they are not spared any hardship: three hour long power outages occur daily.  These hardships have costs, which could snowball to a large disruption.

From a top-down approach, the Syrian regime has not learned from its Iraqi neighbor’s experience: Iraq’s authoritarian rule under Saddam Hussein throughout the 80s and 90s presents a variety of lessons learned. Generally:

1) Gorging civil society incites violence;

2) International sanctions are actually very effective to a fault;

3) Gulf countries’ leadership remain reticent even when they decide to no longer trade with targeted country;

4) Specifically, economic sanctions rely on the middle class to organize swiftly and implement boycotts because the time horizon of long period of sanctions works against their organizing interests, while alienating civil society and hurting households.

Certainly, there are many other lessons learned. Economic sanctions require citizens to behave as ‘dissatisfied consumers’ AND act like highly-organized union which conducts effective internal boycotts.

Overall, the macro-economic picture of Syria looks bleak as any economic sanctions regime has exemplified. Of course Syrian regime leaders say otherwise: Finance Minister Mohammad Al-Jleilati argues that Syria regime expects growth of 1 percent, according to BusinessWeek magazine.

Looking at Iraq, it will take several generations for Syria to rebuild its economy, civil society, and it investor confidence–civil war or not. At the very least, because of the growing civil disobedience, the Syrian people will not have to rebuild its path towards dignity. When it comes to revolution, change comes from within, as we had HOPED to see with Iraq and Libya but remains to be fully actualized, and as we hope to see with Syria.

Regardless if Syria is not Libya, and thereby “exempt” from any chance to have R2P applied, Syria may not be Iraq either.  We learned that Iraq’s economic sanctions did not launch a civil disobedience movement.  Also, we learned from Libya that not even foreign military intervention removed Gaddafi.  His people removed him…permanently.

Note: For a more exhaustive list of statistics regarding the social and human costs of economic sanctions on Iraq, please view the PBS Frontline coverage.

Mehrunisa Qayyum is the founder of PITA POLICY and a Political Economy of MENA Consultant, based in Washington D.C. Follow her @PITAPOLICY

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4. Libya: a Sad Day
5. Al Jazeera Drops the Ball on Syria?